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Abstract - We examine the impact of the 2003 dividend tax cut, 
which removes the differential taxation between dividends and capi-
tal gains for individual investors, on the ex–dividend day price and 
trading volume. We fi nd the ex–dividend day price and volume are 
affected by taxes, risk, and transaction costs. The ex–dividend day 
price drop ratio (excess return) increases (decreases) and dividend 
clienteles weaken after the tax cut. Ex–dividend day abnormal 
volume among high dividend yield stocks decreases after the tax cut 
consistent with a diminished motivation for tax–induced trading. 
Our results suggest that individual investors have a measurable 
effect on the ex–dividend day price and trading volume. 
INTRODUCTION
On May 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed into law the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2003 (hereafter 2003 Act). The 2003 Act creates lower 
dividend and capital gains tax rates for individual investors.1 
Dividends were previously taxed at the ordinary income tax 
rate applicable to each taxpayer. However, under the 2003 Act, 
dividends received by an individual shareholder are taxed at 
the same rates that apply to capital gains. By removing the 
preferential tax treatment of capital gains over dividends for 
individuals, the 2003 Act provides a unique and signifi cant 
event to study the impact of taxes and individual investors 
on the ex–dividend day stock price and trading behavior. 
Research has focused extensively on ex–dividend day 
stock behavior. However, there is no consensus on the 
explanation for the widely documented phenomenon that 
the ex–dividend day price drops by less than the amount 
of the dividend. The tax–based explanation attributes this 
phenomenon to the preferential taxation of capital gains 
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1 Previously, assets held for more than one year were generally taxed at a 
maximum net capital gains rate of 20 percent (ten percent for taxpayers in the 
ten and 15 percent tax bracket). A lower rate of 18 percent (eight percent for 
taxpayers in the ten and 15 percent tax brackets) applied to capital gains on 
assets held for more than fi ve years (qualifi ed fi ve–year capital gains). Under 
the 2003 Act, the maximum net capital gains tax for assets held for more than 
one year was lowered from 20 to 15 percent (and from ten to fi ve percent for 
taxpayers in the ten or 15 percent tax bracket). These new rates apply to sales 
and exchanges and payments received on or after May 6, 2003.
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over dividends. Elton and Gruber (1970) 
proposed the tax clientele theory that the 
ex–dividend day price drop ratio (PDR) 
reflects the relative tax rates between 
dividends and capital gains. Extending 
the tax clientele theory, Michaely and Vila 
(1995) propose the dynamic trading clien-
tele theory which argues that investors 
with differential tax–induced valuation 
of dividends and capital gains trade with 
each other around the ex–dividend day, so 
as to determine the ex–dividend day price 
and trading volume. The dynamic trading 
clientele theory combines tax motivations, 
transaction costs, and the risk tolerance of 
investors. Two alternative explanations 
that challenge the tax–based explanation 
include the short–term arbitrage theory 
proposed by Kalay (1982). He argues that 
arbitrageurs dominate the market and 
exploit any difference between the ex–
dividend day price and the dividend such 
that any difference remaining is equal to 
transaction costs. Because arbitrageurs 
dominate the market in the short–term 
trading theory, tax changes that impact 
only individuals would not be predicted 
to impact the ex–dividend day PDR. Sec-
ondly, market microstructure arguments 
suggest that price discreteness (e.g., Bali 
and Hite, 1998) or bid–ask bounce (e.g., 
Frank and Jagannathan, 1998) causes the 
ex–dividend day price drop to be less than 
the dividend.
Our paper attempts to determine the 
role of taxes and individual investors 
in the determination of stock prices and 
trading volume around the ex–dividend 
day. We analyze the ratio of price drop 
to dividend on the ex–dividend day, the 
excess return and trading volume around 
the ex–dividend day before and after the 
2003 Act. We examine stocks that pay 
regular taxable cash dividends, excluding 
closed–end funds, unit investment trusts, 
exchange traded funds (ETFs), American 
depository receipts (ADRs), and real 
estate investment trusts (REITs), between 
February 2001 and December 2005. By 
beginning our analysis in February 2001, 
we avoid the change in the market micro-
structure and transaction costs associated 
with stocks converting to decimal quota-
tions through the end of January 2001. 
We also attempt to address whether indi-
vidual investors have a signifi cant effect 
on ex–dividend price behavior around the 
2003 dividend tax cut. 
Our results support the tax–based 
explanation for ex–dividend day price 
and trading behavior. With the removal 
of the preferential taxation for capital 
gains over dividends, the ex–dividend 
day PDR increases and moves toward 
one while the excess return decreases and 
moves toward zero. Our results show the 
dividend clienteles, either in the form of 
long–term buy and hold clienteles in the 
model of Elton and Gruber (1970) or in the 
form of trading clienteles in the model of 
Michaely and Vila (1995), weaken after 
the 2003 Act. Also with the reduction of 
the tax heterogeneity among investors, 
ex–dividend day abnormal trading vol-
ume among high dividend yield stocks 
signifi cantly decreases after the 2003 Act 
consistent with a diminished motivation 
for tax–induced trading. 
We also fi nd signifi cant effects associated 
with transaction costs on the ex–dividend 
day PDR, excess return and trading vol-
ume and risk on the ex–dividend day PDR, 
and trading volume. These fi ndings are 
consistent with predictions of the dynamic 
tax–motivated trading clientele model of 
Michaely and Vila (1995). Furthermore, 
given that the 2003 Act only changes the 
tax rates for individual investors and not 
tax–exempt institutional investors or cor-
porate investors, our results suggest that 
individual investors have a measurable 
effect on the ex–dividend day stock price 
and trading behavior. 
Our study contributes to the literature 
in the following ways. First, we are among 
the few to analyze the recent tax cut and its 
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associated effects on both the ex–dividend 
day price formation and tax–motivated 
trading activities around the ex–dividend 
day in a comprehensive setting. Although 
other studies analyze the 2003 dividend 
tax cut, many focus on the tax cut’s impact 
on corporate dividend payouts or the 
markets reaction to the dividend tax cut 
(e.g., Amromin, Harrison, and Sharpe, 
2006; Auerbach and Hassett, 2006; Chetty 
and Saez, 2006; and Howton and Howton, 
2006). An exception is Chetty, Rosenberg, 
and Saez (2007) who analyze the effect of 
the 2003 dividend tax cut on ex–dividend 
day price and excess returns, but do not 
examine trading volume. Cloyd, Li, and 
Weaver (2006) focus on both the effect of 
price discreteness and the 2003 tax cut on 
excess returns and trading volume, but 
their post–Act time period is very short, 
ending in December of 2003. If individual 
investor taxes impact security prices, 
excess returns, and trading volume, 
this, in turn, can affect various facets of 
corporate fi nance, governmental revenue 
collection, and financial investments. 
Second, our study provides additional 
empirical support for the tax–motivated 
trading clientele model of Michaely and 
Villa (1995). Lastly, our study suggests 
that tax laws that infl uence the relative 
taxation of individual investors affect 
individual investors’ trading behavior 
and the price formation of dividend pay-
ing stocks.
This paper is organized as follows. 
The first section describes the related 
literature regarding the ex–dividend day 
PDR, excess return and trading volume, 
and develops our hypotheses on the effect 
of the 2003 tax cut on the ex–dividend 
day market behavior. The second section 
describes our data and empirical meth-
odology. The third section presents our 
empirical results and the fourth section 
concludes the study.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that 
when a stock goes ex–dividend, its price 
theoretically should drop by the amount of 
the dividend. However, empirical research 
has widely documented that the price drop 
is less than the amount of the dividend.2 
There are many explanations for this phe-
nomenon, including the differential tax 
treatment of capital gains and dividends. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) fi rst pro-
pose the idea of dividend clienteles. They 
argue that while dividend policy may be 
irrelevant in determining a corporation’s 
value, in imperfect capital markets in which 
dividends are taxed more heavily than capi-
tal gains, investors could form “clienteles” 
so that investors in high tax brackets hold 
low dividend yield stocks, while investors 
in low tax brackets hold high dividend 
yield stocks. Elton and Gruber (1970) argue 
that differential taxation of dividends and 
capital gains affects the behavior of prices 
on the day stocks pay dividends. In their 
model, marginal investors are long–term 
investors, who should be indifferent 
to selling on the cum–dividend day or 
ex–dividend day.3 In equilibrium, ignoring 
transaction costs and risk, the PDR refl ects 
the ratio of differential tax rates between 
dividends and capital gains:
[1] PDR =
P P
D
t
t
cum ex d
c
−
=
−
−
1
1
where 
 2 See for example, Campbell and Beranek (1955), Elton and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), Lakonishok and Ver-
maelen (1983), Barclay (1987), Karpoff and Walkling (1990).
3 As described by Elton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1984), at the time of the original Elton and Gruber (1970) analysis, 
transaction costs were suffi ciently high to ensure that short–term traders were not setting equilibrium prices 
on the ex–dividend day.
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
108
Pcum is the cum–dividend day price,
Pex is the expected ex–dividend day 
price,
D is the dividend amount,
td is the dividend tax rate and 
tc is the capital gains tax rate.
The tax effect on the ex–dividend day 
share price can also be expressed in terms 
of excess return. The ex–dividend day 
realized return is equal to 
[2] P D P
P
P P
D
D
P
t
ex cum
cum
cum ex
cum
+ −
= −
−⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
× =
1
d c
c cum
t
t
D
P
−
−1
*
as implied by the static tax clientele model 
of Elton and Gruber (1970). The excess 
return for the ex–dividend day is the 
realized daily return subtracted from the 
expected return. 
Many studies have used changes in tax 
laws to test the tax clientele theory (or 
long–term trading hypothesis) of Elton 
and Gruber (1970). Evidence support-
ing the tax effect is provided by several 
studies, e.g., Barclay (1987), Robin (1991), 
Lasfer (1995), Koski (1996), Lamdin and 
Hiemstra (1993), Poterba and Summers 
(1984), Bell and Jenkinson (2002), and Gra-
ham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003). How-
ever, Michaely (1991) fi nds the 1986 Tax 
Reform has no effect on the ex–dividend 
day price behavior. Michaely argues that 
individual investors are less infl uential 
while institutional and corporate traders 
play a more signifi cant role on the ex–divi-
dend day price behavior when transaction 
costs are lower. If the marginal investor 
is the corporate investor, who has prefer-
ential taxation of dividends over capital 
gains, then the PDR should be greater 
than one. Eades, Hess, and Kim (1984) fi nd 
evidence consistent with the tax clienteles 
if the marginal investors are corporations. 
Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) revisit the 
tax clientele theory by studying taxable 
versus nontaxable closed–end funds. They 
fi nd the PDR for nontaxable closed–end 
funds is larger than one, which is consis-
tent with the prediction of the tax theory 
as dividend tax rates are lower than capital 
gains tax rates.
Several studies extend the work of Elton 
and Gruber (1970), to investigate how the 
interaction of taxes, transaction costs, and 
risk affects ex–dividend day price and 
volume. Michaely and Vila (1995) develop 
a dynamic model where ex–dividend day 
price and volume is a function of tax het-
erogeneity among traders, aggregate risk 
tolerance and risk of the individual stock 
around the ex–dividend day. Investors 
with differential tax–induced valuation 
of dividends and capital gains trade 
with each other around the ex–dividend 
day which can generate higher volume, 
higher excess return and a PDR less than 
one. In the Michaely and Vila model, the 
PDR refl ects the relative tax rates of all 
market participants, not just the marginal 
trader’s: 
[3] E PDR
X K
D D P
e( )
( / )
/
= − = −α
σ
α
ν2
where α− is the average of investors’ rela-
tive tax preference of dividend to capital 
gains weighted by their risk tolerance; X is 
the aggregate demand for securities on the 
ex–dividend day; σe
2 is the ex–dividend 
day variance; K is the aggregate risk toler-
ance and ν is the risk premium.
Michaely and Vila (1995) also show that 
trading volume around the ex–dividend 
day is positively related to tax heterogene-
ity and negatively related to transaction 
costs and risk resulting from the devia-
tion from an otherwise optimal portfolio. 
Empirical support for the dynamic tax–
motivated trading hypothesis is provided 
by Michaely and Murgia (1995), Michaely 
and Vila (1996), Wu and Hsu (1996), and 
Dhaliwal and Li (2006). 
Alternatively, the short–term trading 
theory is based on the premise that mar-
ket pricing is dominated by short–term 
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arbitrageurs. Kalay (1982) argues that 
short–term arbitrageurs would exploit 
any difference between the ex–dividend 
day price drop and the dividend until they 
are approximately equal. If transaction 
costs are zero, the ex–dividend day PDR 
should be equal to one since arbitrageurs 
have the same tax rate on their short–term 
capital gains as on dividends. If transac-
tion costs are small, by assuming a simple 
form, the PDR should be bounded around 
one as
[4] 1 1− ≤ ≤ +
α αP
D
PDR
P
D
where αP
–
 is the expected transaction 
cost of “a round trip.” Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1983), Karpoff and Walkling 
(1988), Boyd and Jagannathan (1994), and 
Wu and Hsu (1996) provide support for 
this explanation. 
An alternative microstructure explana-
tion includes Bali and Hite (1998) who 
argue that the stock price drops less than 
the dividend because of price discreteness 
rather than taxes. Frank and Jagannathan 
(1998) argue that bid–ask bounce contrib-
utes to a price drop that is less than the 
dividend. However, Graham et al. (2003) 
and Jakob and Ma (2004) examine the effect 
of changes in price quotation and fi nd no 
support for the microstructure explanation. 
Cloyd et al. (2006) show that both price 
discreteness and differential taxation affect 
ex–dividend day price behavior.
The 2003 Act signifi cantly lowers the 
dividend tax rate and removes the pref-
erential taxation of capital gains over 
dividends for individual investors. Hence 
the examination of the impact of the 
2003 Act on the ex–dividend day share 
price, excess return, and volume behav-
ior provides an opportunity to further 
examine the tax–based theories. Before 
the 2003 dividend tax cut, dividends are 
taxed more heavily than capital gains for 
individual investors. Individual investors, 
therefore, prefer capital gains to dividends 
while tax–exempt institutional investors 
are indifferent between dividends and 
capital gains, and corporate investors 
prefer dividends to capital gains. The 
2003 Act increases the relative tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains for individual 
investors while other investors’ relative 
tax rates are unchanged.
Because the PDR refl ects the relative 
tax rate of the marginal investor, if the 
marginal investor is an individual inves-
tor, we expect the ex–dividend day PDR to 
be less than one before the 2003 Act. After 
the 2003 Act, tax rates for dividend and 
capital gains are equal for all individual 
investors. Hence equation [1] predicts that 
the PDR should increase to one. How-
ever, individual investors may still face a 
relative tax penalty on dividends as they 
can defer capital gains causing actual 
capital gains tax rates to remain lower 
than dividend tax rates even after the 
2003 Act.4 Thus the PDR may increase 
but still remain lower than one after the 
2003 Act. Equation [4] of the dynamic 
trading clientele model also suggests that 
as long as individual investors participate 
in ex–dividend trading, the PDR should 
increase after the 2003 Act. The average of 
all investors’ relative tax rates increases 
since the relative tax rates for individual 
investors increase and the relative tax 
rates for other investors such as institu-
tional or corporate investors remain the 
same after the 2003 Act. Similarly, we 
expect a positive ex–dividend day excess 
return before the 2003 Act and a decrease 
in the excess return after the tax cut once 
dividends and capital gains taxes are 
equal for individual investors. This leads 
to our fi rst hypothesis. 
4 Chay, Choi, and Pontiff (2006) fi nd investors are compensated seven cents in unrealized gains for each dollar 
of realized capital gains, that is, one dollar of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93 cents of unrealized 
gains.
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Hypothesis 1a: The PDR for dividend 
paying stocks should increase after the 
2003 Act and become closer to one.
Hypothesis 1b: The ex–dividend day 
excess return for dividend paying stocks 
should decrease after the 2003 Act and 
become closer to zero.
The dividend clientele theory states 
that investors in high (low) tax brackets 
will prefer low (high) dividend pay-
ing stocks when there is preferential 
taxation of capital gains to dividends. 
Thus, the implied relative tax rates for 
marginal investors should decrease with 
dividend yields. As the PDR refl ects the 
marginal investor’s tax rate, it should be 
an increasing function of dividend yield. 
When the tax differential for individual 
investors disappears (or weakens due to 
the deferability of capital gains) after the 
2003 Act, equation [1] predicts that the 
dividend clientele effect will disappear 
(or weaken). However, to the extent that 
transaction costs are important and 
dividend yield proxies transaction costs, 
the relation between the PDR and the 
dividend yield becomes uncertain. As 
dividend yield increases, more indi-
vidual investors can participate in the 
ex–dividend day trading due to the lower 
transaction costs, which will change the 
aggregate average relative tax rate.5 Thus, 
the relation between the PDR (or excess 
return) and dividend yield becomes an 
empirical question. Our second hypoth-
esis follows.
Hypothesis 2a: The PDR should be posi-
tively correlated with the dividend yield 
before the 2003 Act and the correlation 
should weaken or disappear after the 
2003 Act.
Hypothesis 2b: The ex–dividend day 
excess return should be positively cor-
related with the dividend yield before 
the 2003 Act and the correlation should 
weaken or disappear after the 2003 Act.
The dynamic trading clientele theory 
predicts a large abnormal volume (AV) 
around the ex–dividend day. Also tax–
induced trading around the ex–dividend 
day results from the differential valuations 
of dividends versus capital gains among 
market participants. Because the 2003 
Act not only removes the tax heterogene-
ity among individual investors, but also 
aligns the tax differential of individual 
investors with institutional investors and 
arbitrageurs, the gains of trading become 
smaller. With the reduction of tax–induced 
trading motives, ex–dividend day trading 
volume should decrease. This leads to our 
third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The trading volume around 
the ex–dividend day should decrease after 
the 2003 Act.
Transaction costs play an important 
role in trading behavior. Trading around 
the ex–dividend day may be unprofi table 
when traders face large transaction costs. 
Since low dividend yield stocks have rela-
tively higher transaction costs than high 
dividend yield stocks, stocks with a high 
dividend yield are more likely to show a 
signifi cant amount of tax–induced trading 
around the ex–dividend day. Hence, we 
expect the decrease in the ex–dividend 
day trading volume to be more signifi -
cant for high dividend yield stocks. Risk, 
just like transaction costs, discourages 
trading around the ex–dividend day. As 
implied by the dynamic trading model of 
Michaely and Vila (1995), trading volume 
is a decreasing function of transaction costs 
5 See Cloyd et al. (2006) for further discussions of how the positive relation between dividend yield and ex–day 
abnormal returns may be mitigated by heterogeneous tax rates across investors.
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and risk. Therefore our last hypothesis is 
as follows.
Hypothesis 4: Trading volume is positively 
related to dividend yield and negatively 
related to risk and transaction costs.
Given that the 2003 Act only lowers 
dividend tax rates for individuals, any 
signifi cant changes on the ex–dividend 
day price behavior before and after the tax 
cut would suggest that the ex–dividend 
day price refl ects individual investors’ 
relative tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains. This would suggest that individual 
investors’ preferences have a measurable 
impact on ex–dividend day price forma-
tion and trading behavior. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We collect data from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We 
examine fi rms that pay taxable regular cash 
dividends (distribution codes 1222, 1232, 
1242, and 1252) to their common stockhold-
ers (share codes 10, 11, and 12).6 We exclude 
closed–end funds, unit investment trusts, 
ETFs, ADRs, and REITs because of their 
different tax treatment and more complex 
distributions. We eliminate observations 
where the dividend was less than one 
cent,7 where there was no trade on the 
ex–dividend date, or the price was lower 
than fi ve dollars.8 By the end of January 
2001, all New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
stocks had converted their price quotations 
to decimals.9 Thus, we choose February 
2001 as the starting point of our study to 
avoid the possible effect of the change in 
the market microstructure. We eliminate 
year 2003 as the transition year since there 
may be a lag in investors’ restructuring of 
their portfolios.10 Therefore we use 2001 
(excluding January) and 2002 to represent 
a distinct pre–Act period and 2004 and 2005 
to represent a distinct post–Act period.
To estimate the PDR, we adopt a method-
ology similar to Michaely (1991). We adjust 
the ex–dividend day closing price by the 
expected daily return of the stock.11 We esti-
mate the expected return using the market 
model over the window –45 to –2 and +2 to 
+45, where day zero is the ex–dividend day 
and the market return is the value–weighted 
market portfolio (including distributions). 
Our event window is the same that is used 
by Michaely and Vila (1995)
[5] PDR
P
P
E r
Di
i cum
i ex
i
i
=
−
+,
,
( )1
where 
Pi,cum is the cum–dividend day closing 
price for stock i,
Pi,ex is the ex–dividend day closing price 
for stock i, 
E(ri) is the expected daily return of stock i, 
estimated by the market model, and 
Di is the dividend amount for stock i.
 6 The share and distribution codes are the same as those used for the announcement analysis in Chetty et al. 
(2007).
 7 The minimum tick size is one cent.
 8 Following Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) among others, we eliminate observations with prices below fi ve 
dollars because for low–priced securities, the bid/ask spread is large relative to the dividend and introduces 
noise into our analysis. 
 9 See details in Graham et al. (2003).
10 Our data show that the PDR is extremely high in the second quarter of 2003 when the Act is enacted and the 
PDRs of the third and fourth quarter of 2003 are still close to that of 2002, which implies a lag. 
11 The natural ex–dividend price is the opening price. But the opening price is biased because all orders on the 
books are adjusted by the amount of the dividend. Therefore, we use closing prices and adjust for the daily 
return on the ex–dividend day (e.g., Elton et al., 2005; Lamdin and Hiemstra, 1993; and Wu and Hsu, 1996).
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Due to the large variation in our divi-
dend distribution sample, we winsorize 
the data at the 2.5 percent level to reduce 
the effect of outliers.12 Furthermore, fol-
lowing Michaely (1991), we correct two 
sources of heteroskedasticity: the securi-
ty’s variance and the dividend yield effect. 
The stock variance is calculated from the 
market model and dividend yield is calcu-
lated as the amount of the cash dividend 
divided by the cum–dividend price. As 
shown in Michaely (1991), the covariance 
matrix of the disturbances of ex–dividend 
day PDR is
Ωij
i id if i j
otherwise
=
⎧⎨⎪⎩⎪
=σ 2 2
0
/
where σi
2 is the variance of stock i, esti-
mated from the market model, and di is 
the dividend yield on stock i.
So the mean PDR is calculated using 
weighted least squares where:
[6] PDR
d PDR
d
i i i
i
n
i i
i
n=
×
=
=
∑
∑
( / )
( / )
2 2
1
2 2
1
σ
σ
.
In addition, we use the median of the 
PDR since the price drop ratio may not be 
normally distributed. The Wilcoxon sign 
test is used to test the median difference 
from one and Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney 
test is used to test the difference in the 
PDR before and after the 2003 Act. The 
two–sided p–value is reported in the 
tables.
We also analyze the ex–dividend day 
excess returns to further examine the 
ex–dividend day price behavior. We cal-
culated the ex–dividend day excess return 
on stock i as
[7] 
P D P
P
E ri ex i i cum
i cum
i
, ,
,
( )
+ −
− .
Besides the ex–dividend day, we exam-
ine returns of ten days surrounding the 
ex–dividend day. Our study window is 
[–5, +5], where day zero is the ex–dividend 
day. We use [–45, –6] and [6, 45] as our esti-
mation window to calculate the expected 
return by the market model. We adopt the 
weighted least squares with the inverse of 
the standard deviation of the estimation 
period return as the weight to correct for 
heteroskedasticity.
Following Michaely and Vila (1995), 
risk is measured by the variance of the 
security’s return scaled by the variance of 
the market returns during the estimation 
period of the market model. Similar to 
Michaely and Vila (1996), we use market 
capitalization on the cum–dividend day as 
a proxy for transaction costs. Our assump-
tion is that large–capitalization stocks are 
more liquid and have lower transaction 
costs. To reduce the effect of outliers, we 
specify the variable as the natural loga-
rithm of market capitalization. 
Similar to Michaely and Vila (1995) 
and Graham et al. (2003), we measure 
trading volume by stock turnover. Daily 
turnover is defi ned as the ratio of daily 
shares traded to shares outstanding. We 
compute the average turnover from the 
average daily turnover for days –45 to –6 
and +6 to +45
[8] ATO
TO
Ti
itt
=
∈ − − ∪ + +∑ [ , ] [ , ]45 6 6 45
where TOit is the daily turnover for secu-
rity i on day t, and T is the number of days 
with valid volume observations in the esti-
mation period. Then for each day in the 
12 Graham et al. (2003) trim the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles of premium to reduce the effect of outliers in their 
analysis. As an alternative to winsorizing our data, we trim the top and bottom 2.5 percentiles and the results 
are qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper. 
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event window [–5, +5], we calculate the 
AV as the difference between the stock’s 
actual to average turnover, relative to the 
average turnover:
[9] AV
TO ATO
ATOit
it i
i
=
−
The mean daily AV for the sample is 
computed as
[10] AV
AV
N
tt
it
i
N
= ∈ − +=
∑
1 5 5[ , ]
We also compute the cumulative abnor-
mal volume (CAV) of 11 days around the 
ex–dividend day. The mean of CAV is cal-
culated in the same way as the mean of AV. 
T–statistics for the volume are calculated 
using the cross–sectional estimates of the 
variance of abnormal volume. Given that 
the daily turnover data is highly skewed, 
we winsorize the daily AV data at the 2.5 
percent level. Data with missing or nega-
tive trading volume are deleted from the 
sample.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We begin by providing some overall 
statistics regarding the dividend behav-
ior of fi rms (share codes 10–12) tracked 
by CRSP (distribution codes 1222, 1232, 
1242, and 1252) between the period 2001 
and 2005 in Table 1.13 We eliminate fi rms 
paying less than a one–cent regular 
dividend and fi rms with a stock price 
lower than fi ve dollars. Based on these 
restrictions, the number of fi rms paying 
regular dividends has increased from 
1,751 fi rms in 2001 to 1,898 fi rms in 2005. 
The number of dividend initiations and 
the number of fi rms continuing to pay 
dividends has similarly increased over the 
period with a corresponding decline in the 
number of fi rms discontinuing dividends. 
Most dramatically, the number of fi rms 
initiating dividends more than doubled 
between 2002 and 2003 (102 to 215) and the 
number of fi rms discontinuing dividends 
went from 310 in 2001 to 119 in 2003.14 
We also document an increasing average 
annual dividend per share which during 
the pre–Act period was 0.536 and 0.546 
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND PAYMENT
Number of fi rms paying dividends
Number of fi rms initiating dividends
Number of fi rms discontinuing dividends
Number of fi rms continuing dividends
 
Number of fi rms increasing dividends
Number of fi rms with no change in dividends
Number of fi rms decreasing dividends
 
Average annual dividend amount per share
Percentage change in dividend
Average annual dividend yield
2001
1,751
112
310
1639
707
798
134
0.536
1.13%
2.57%
2002
1,661
102
192
1559
619
798
142
0.546
1.87%
2.47%
2003
1,757
215
119
1542
715
684
143
0.547
0.18%
2.36%
2004
1,847
190
100
1657
844
678
135
0.560
2.38%
2.11%
2005
1,898
181
130
1717
 
898
659
160
 
0.583
4.11%
2.16%
Note: This table provides summary of fi rms (share codes 10–12) paying regular dividends (distribution codes 1222, 
1232, 1242, and 1252) between 2001 and 2005. Firms paying lower than one–cent dividend or with price lower 
than fi ve dollars are eliminated. Percentage change in dividend is calculated as (average annualized dividend 
per sharet – average annualized dividend per sharet–1)/average annualized dividend per sharet.
13 We eliminate share codes for closed–end funds, unit investment trusts, ETFs, ADRs, REITs, and distribution 
codes for unknown, unspecifi ed, special, interim, and non–recurring dividends.
14 Our results appear consistent with Chetty and Saez (2006) who provide detailed analyses of the effect of the 
dividend tax cut on overall corporate payout policy.
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in 2001 and 2002, respectively, while the 
average annual dividend per share during 
the post–Act period was 0.560 and 0.583 
in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
Table 1 shows that the composition of 
fi rms paying dividends across time may 
be changing substantially. Chetty and Saez 
(2006) also fi nd that the 2003 Act induced 
many fi rms to initiate dividend payments. 
To avoid introducing a composition bias 
into the sample, we restrict the remainder 
of our analysis to fi rms that pay dividends 
in all four years of the pre– and post–Act 
periods that results in a sample of 1,278 
fi rms. Firms may change the amount or fre-
quency of distribution of dividends during 
the pre– and post–Act periods, however.15 
PDR AND EXCESS RETURN ANALYSIS
Next we turn our focus to Table 2, Panel 
A where we present descriptive statistics 
for the ex–dividend day PDR for each of 
the four years around the 2003 Act. Unless 
otherwise noted, all results reported for 
the PDR are based on the winsorized 
data to reduce the effect of outliers caused 
by the large variation in the PDR that 
arises from a large price change or a tiny 
dividend. First we note that there are 4,318 
and 4,713 dividend distribution events 
in 2001 and 2002, respectively, while the 
number of payouts is 4,772 and 4,677 in 
2004 and 2005, respectively. Although we 
restrict the analysis to 1,278 fi rms that pay 
TABLE 2
EX–DIVIDEND DAY PDR
Year
Median
(Sign test p value)
Mean
(t–stat)
Min
Max 
S.D
Sample size
2001
0.510***
(0.00)
0.653***
(9.68)
–18.81
20.61
6.68
4,318
2002
0.613***
(0.00)
0.645***
(11.14)
–16.13
18.24
5.81
4,713
2004
0.763***
(0.00)
0.857***
(5.92)
–13.37
14.63
4.64
4,772
2005
0.757***
(0.00)
0.870***
(5.65)
–13.90
14.67
4.62
4,677
Panel A: PDR for Taxable Quarterly Dividends
Panel B: Difference in PDR
Median
(Wilcoxon p value)
Mean
(t–stat)
Sample size
Pre–Act
0.562***
(0.00)
0.648***
(14.74)
9,031
Post–Act
0.759***
(0.00)
0.864***
(8.17)
9,449
Post–Pre
0.197***
(0.00)
0.215***
(7.40)
18,480
Difference
(02–01)
0.105***
(0.04)
–0.009
(–0.18)
9,031
Difference
(05–04)
–0.006
(0.50)
0.012
(0.37)
9,449
Notes: 
PDR is defi ned as the cum–dividend day closing price minus the ex–dividend day closing price (adjusted by 
the expected daily return) divided by the dividend amount. The expected daily return is estimated using the 
market model with estimation period [–45, –6] and [6, 45]. The market return is defi ned as the return of the 
value–weighted market portfolio including distributions. The mean has been corrected for two sources of het-
eroskedasticity: the security’s variance and the dividend yield effect. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. The 
sample includes taxable dividend payments (distribution codes 1222, 1232, 1242, and 1252) of common stocks 
(share codes 10–12) in 2001 (excluding January), 2002, 2004, and 2005. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to 
December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. Wilcoxon sign test p–values 
are reported for testing the median equal to one and t–statistics are reported for testing the mean equal to one. In 
Panel B, Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test two side p–values are reported for testing the difference in the medians 
equal to zero and t–statistics are reported for testing the difference in the means equal to zero.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
15 To determine the sensitivity of our results to requiring fi rms to pay dividends over all four years of the pre– and 
post–Act period, we estimate all of our model specifi cations with the full sample of fi rms that meet the share 
and distribution code requirements. Our results are qualitatively the same as those reported unless otherwise 
noted in the paper.
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dividends in all four years, our dividend 
distribution sample sizes are not equal 
for several reasons. First, we only capture 
11 months of distributions in 2001 due 
to decimalization. Second, firms may 
increase or reduce the frequency of pay-
ment over the four–year period. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 2, the 
mean PDR is signifi cantly lower than one 
before the tax cut: 0.653 for 2001 and 0.645 
for 2002. After the 2003 Act the mean PDR 
increases to 0.857 in 2004 and 0.870 in 2005. 
Analyzing the medians generates similar 
results. The median PDR increases from 
0.510 in 2001 and 0.613 in 2002 to 0.763 
in 2004 and 0.757 in 2005.16 Despite the 
signifi cant increase in the PDR from 2002 
to 2004, the PDR remains signifi cantly less 
than one. This phenomenon may result 
from individual investors’ ability to defer 
capital gains which causes capital gains 
tax rates to remain lower than dividend 
tax rates for individual investors even 
after the 2003 Act. Alternatively, a PDR 
that is less than one is also consistent with 
the dynamic trading model of Michaely 
and Vila (1995). Even when the average 
relative tax rate is one, the risk involved 
in the ex–dividend day trading results in a 
PDR that is less than one (see, for example, 
equation [4]). 
We also test the structural change in 
the PDR by dividing the sample into 
pre– and post–Act periods, as presented 
in Panel B of Table 2. The median (mean) 
PDR increases after the 2003 Act from 
0.562 (0.648) to 0.759 (0.864), respectively. 
The increase in both the median and 
mean PDR from the pre– to post–Act 
period is statistically signifi cant at the 
one percent level. Furthermore there is no 
signifi cant shift in the mean PDR between 
2001 and 2002 or between 2004 and 
2005. These results suggest a structural 
change between the pre– and post–Act 
periods, thus lending support to our fi rst 
hypothesis. Absent any shift in the market 
microstructure such as price discreteness 
or bid–ask bounce, the structural change 
in the PDR is associated with the dividend 
tax cut. Therefore, our data support the 
tax–based theory on the ex–dividend day 
price behavior. The relative taxation of 
dividends and capital gains does affect 
the ex–dividend day price behavior of 
stocks. 
One potential limitation to our analysis 
is that we analyze a short–window around 
the reform. Chetty et al. (2007) perform a 
similar analysis of the PDR around the 
2003 Act and fi nd that although the PDR 
does rise signifi cantly after the Act, the 
magnitude of the increase is in large part 
due to the unusually low value of the PDR 
during the 2000–2002 period. They argue 
that there is a time series pattern in the 
PDR that appears to be unrelated to taxes. 
To address this concern, we calculate the 
PDR for 1998 and 1999 since this period 
captures a similar dividend tax regime 
as in the 2001 and 2002 period. In results 
not shown, we calculate the full sample 
winsorized mean (median) PDR to be 
0.754 (0.647) and 0.707 (0.629) for 1998 and 
1999, respectively. In 2001 and 2002, we 
calculate the mean (median) PDR for the 
full sample to be 0.698 (0.475) and 0.671 
(0.558), respectively. We do not restrict 
the sample to dividend payers for the 
fi ve–year period between 2001 and 2005 
since this would impose an additional 
survivorship bias on the sample if we 
extend this requirement back to 1998. 
Consistent with the fi ndings of Chetty 
et al. (2007) and Graham et al. (2003), we 
note that the mean and median PDRs in 
1998 and 1999 are higher than the PDRs 
in 2001 and 2002. However, in our sample 
of fi rms, the mean and median PDR after 
the 2003 Act remains signifi cantly higher 
than the respective PDRs of 1998 and 
1999. Although it appears that the PDR 
16 Our PDR calculations appear reasonable compared to Chetty et al. (2007) who document a median premium 
of 0.61 in 2002 and 0.74 for 2004.
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in 2001 and 2002 is unusually low relative 
to other time periods, our conclusion that 
taxes have a signifi cant effect on the PDR 
appears robust to the choice of alternative 
pre–Act periods.
Similarly, Table 3 presents the excess 
returns for ten days surrounding the 
ex–dividend day for our four year sample 
period. Consistent with the PDR results, 
ex–dividend day excess returns are sig-
nifi cantly positive. The ex–dividend day 
excess return is 0.319 percent in 2001 and 
0.283 percent in 2002, and it decreases to 
0.108 percent in 2004 and 0.119 percent in 
2005. Consistent with Eades et al. (1984) 
and other studies, we fi nd excess returns 
are not unique for the ex–dividend day. 
The fi ve trading days before the ex–divi-
dend day generally have positive excess 
returns while the fi ve trading days after 
the ex–dividend day generally have 
negative excess returns or excess returns 
insignifi cantly different from zero. But the 
excess returns of the ex–dividend day are 
much larger in magnitude compared to 
other trading days. These patterns can be 
seen from Figure 1. Figure 1 also illustrates 
that excess returns for days surrounding 
the ex–day in the post–Act period are 
smaller and less volatile than those in the 
pre–Act period.
To examine the relation between the 
dividend yield and the PDR, we perform 
regressions where PDR is our dependent 
variable, as shown in Table 4, Panel A. 
Consistent with the predictions of the 
dividend clientele theory, regression (1) 
shows that there is a positive and sig-
nifi cant relation between dividend yield 
and PDR in both the pre– and post–Act 
periods. The coeffi cient on the dividend 
yield in the post–Act period is much 
smaller than that in the pre–Act period, 
indicating the weakening of the dividend 
yield effect. Based on the dynamic trading 
clientele theory, we include a proxy for 
risk (σi
2/ σm
2) and transaction costs (log of 
market capitalization) in regressions (2), 
(3), and (4). Consistent with the theory, 
we find a significant negative relation 
between risk and a signifi cant positive 
relation between market capitalization 
and the PDR in all but one specifi cation 
(Pre–Act) where risk is insignifi cant.17 In 
TABLE 3
EXCESS RETURN FOR THE TEN DAYS SURROUNDING THE EX–DIVIDEND DAY
2001 2002 2004 2005
Day
–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
 ER(%)
 0.041
 0.017
–0.002
 0.016
 0.159***
 0.319***
 0.028
 0.016
–0.062**
–0.026
 0.003
t–stat
 1.41
 0.60
–0.09
 0.59
 5.67
10.77
 0.97
 0.58
–2.21
–0.90
 0.13
 ER(%)
 0.080***
 0.067***
 0.061**
–0.003
 0.038***
 0.283***
–0.037
 0.038
–0.046*
 0.031
–0.015
t–stat
 3.38
 2.66
 2.52
–0.14
 1.59
11.33
–1.46
 1.57
–1.85
 1.35
–0.63
 ER(%)
 0.014
 0.045**
–0.025
 0.055***
 0.052***
 0.108***
 0.010
 0.002
 0.043*
–0.039**
–0.012**
t–stat
 0.73
 2.45
–1.36
 3.12
 2.99
 6.01
 0.56
 0.09
 1.77
–2.20
–0.68
 ER(%)
 0.018
 0.044**
 0.019
–0.010
 0.042**
 0.119***
 0.047
 0.018
 0.027
–0.015
–0.045***
t–stat
 0.88
 2.50
 1.10
–0.48
 2.13
 6.54
 2.76
 1.04
 1.51
–0.88
–2.77
Notes: 
The excess return is the return above that predicted by the market model. The market return is defi ned as the 
return of the value–weighted portfolio including distributions. The estimation period for the market model is 
[–45, –6] and [6, 45]. Weighted least squares are used to calculate the average excess return with the inverse of 
the standard deviation of the estimation period return as the weight. Excess returns in the 11–day event window 
[–5, +5] are presented (ex–dividend day = 0). T–statistics are for testing the null hypothesis that mean excess 
return is zero. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 
1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
17 If we estimate Panel A of Table 4 for the full sample of fi rms without restricting the sample to dividend payers 
in all four years, the risk measure becomes insignifi cant in the post–Act period.
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the pre–Act period, the dividend yield 
effect is very strong, which may dominate 
the effect of risk. Because stocks with large 
fi rm size tend to have lower transaction 
costs, the positive relation between the 
PDR and market capitalization indicates 
a negative association between transac-
tion costs and the PDR. The 2003 Act sig-
nifi cantly increases the average PDR even 
after controlling for dividend yield, risk, 
and market capitalization, as refl ected in 
the signifi cant positive coeffi cient on a 
post–Act dummy variable in regression 
(3). In column 4, we interact the dividend 
yield with our post–Act dummy variable 
to further determine whether dividend 
clienteles weaken after the reduction in 
dividend taxes for individuals. The coef-
fi cient on the interaction term (–18.121) is 
negative and signifi cant, suggesting that 
the dividend clienteles weaken signifi -
cantly after the 2003 Act. 
We similarly analyze the relation 
between dividend yield and ex–dividend 
day excess returns with results reported in 
Panel B of Table 4. Regression (1) shows 
that the dividend yield effect is signifi cant 
in the pre–Act period and is insignifi cant 
in the post–Act period. Regression (2) 
shows that market capitalization has a 
signifi cant effect on excess returns in both 
pre– and post–Act periods, indicating 
that transaction costs have a signifi cant 
positive effect on ex–dividend day excess 
returns. Risk, however, is insignifi cant in 
all model specifi cations, consistent with 
the fi nding of Michaely and Villa (1995). 
They argue that this result is consistent 
with the notion that only beta risk is 
priced, as excess returns are already beta 
adjusted. 
We also test the structural change in 
ex–dividend day excess returns before 
and after the 2003 Act. The average 
excess return declines after the tax cut, 
as reflected in the significant negative 
coeffi cient on a post–Act dummy vari-
able in regression (3). This result lends 
further support to our fi rst hypothesis 
that the relative taxation of dividends and 
capital gains does affect the ex–dividend 
day excess return behavior of stocks. 
We further add the interaction term of 
the dividend yield with the post–Act 
dummy variable into regression (4). The 
excess return is positively related to the 
dividend yield, but the relation weakens 
in the post–Act period, as indicated by 
Figure 1. Excess Return for the Ten Days Surrounding the Ex–dividend Day
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TABLE 4
TESTS OF THE CHANGE IN DIVIDEND CLIENTELES
Panel A: PDR
Pre–Act Post–Act Full Sample
Intercept
Yield
Risk
Market cap
PostDum
Interaction term
 (Yield) × ( Dummy)
Sample size
R2
(1)
0.377***
(7.71)
23.60***
(6.38)
9,031
0.0045
(2)
–0.511***
(–3.92)
22.312***
(6.04)
–0.016
(–0.94)
0.066***
(7.92)
9,031
0.0118
(1)
0.820***
(37.39)
3.248***
(3.06)
9,449
0.001
(2)
0.124
(1.14)
4.405***
(3.98)
–0.014**
(–2.39)
0.046***
(6.93)
9,449
0.0078
(3)
–0.166**
(–2.10)
5.868***
(5.57)
–0.015***
(–2.71)
0.054***
(10.49)
0.147***
(4.76)
18,480
0.0113
(4)
–0.352***
(–3.97)
22.542***
(6.08)
–0.013**
(–2.41)
0.054***
(10.38)
0.357***
(6.56)
–18.121***
(–4.69)
18,480
0.0125
Panel B: Excess Returns (%)
Intercept 
Yield 
Risk 
Market cap 
PostDum 
Interaction terms
 (Yield) × (Dummy) 
Sample size
R2
0.173***
(4.74)
19.279***
(4.01)
9,031
0.0018
1.106***
(9.61)
10.706**
(2.18)
–0.006
(–0.54)
–0.060***
(–8.80)
9,031
0.0103
0.098***
(4.12)
2.579
(0.78)
9,449
0.0001
0.546***
(6.36)
1.441
(0.43)
–0.002
(–0.60)
–0.028***
(–5.61)
9,449
0.0034
0.746***
(10.90)
18.036***
(5.13 )
–0.005
(–1.34)
–0.039***
(–9.77)
–19.108***
(–6.01)
18,480
0.0093
0.779***
(10.63)
13.720***
(2.81 )
–0.004
(–1.15)
–0.039***
(–9.69)
–0.056
(–1.28)
–12.825**
(–2.19)
18,480
0.0094
Notes: 
We test the change in dividend clienteles. The dependent variable of regressions in Panel A is the PDR. Weighted 
least squares are utilized to correct for heteroskedasticity with the ratio of squared dividend yield to the stock’s 
variance as the weight. The dependent variable of regressions in Panel B is the ex–dividend day excess returns. 
Weighted least squares are used to calculate the average excess return with the inverse of the standard deviation 
of the estimation period return as the weight. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. T–statistics are in parentheses 
under the parameter estimates. Dividend yield is calculated by dividing the dividend amount by the cum–divi-
dend day closing price. Risk is measured by the variance of the security’s return scaled by the variance of the 
market returns during the estimation period [–25, –6] and [6, 25]. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization on the cum–dividend day (i.e., cum–dividend day price multiplied by the outstanding 
shares). Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 
to December 31, 2005. PostDum = 0 for pre–Act period, and 1 otherwise.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Ex–Dividend Day Price and Volume: The Case of 2003 Dividend Tax Cut
119
the statistically signifi cant negative coef-
ficient of the interaction term: –12.825 
percent. The results in Table 4 Panels A 
and B provide support for our second 
hypothesis that predicts a weakening of 
the dividend clienteles.
To gain further insight into dividend 
tax clienteles, we separate our sample 
into four dividend yield groups based on 
Graham et al. (2003) as follows (right–end-
point inclusive):18 annualized dividend 
yield less than or equal to  two percent, 
between two and four percent, between 
four and six percent, and greater than 
six percent. Table 5 presents the mean 
and median PDR of each dividend yield 
group. In the pre–Act period, the mean 
(median) PDR is signifi cantly lower than 
one for each dividend yield group except 
the highest group which has a PDR that 
is insignifi cantly different from one. The 
mean (median) PDR is higher in the post–
Act period than in the pre–Act period for 
each dividend yield group. The highest 
dividend yield group has a PDR higher 
than one in the post–Act period, consistent 
with the notion that the marginal inves-
tor for the highest dividend yield stocks 
are corporate investors. We also note that 
the standard deviation decreases in the 
post–Act period relative to the pre–Act 
period. We graph the mean PDR of each 
dividend yield group in Figure 2.19 We 
illustrate that the mean PDR of each 
dividend yield group after the tax change 
is larger than before the tax change. The 
entire PDR curve shifts up and is less 
varied in the post–Act period compared 
to the pre–Act period. 
Contrary to the prediction of the divi-
dend tax clientele theory that a positive 
relation exists between the PDR and 
the dividend yield, we fi nd a U–shaped 
relation in the pre–Act period. As the 
dividend clientele theory predicts, inves-
tors in the high tax brackets tend to hold 
TABLE 5
PDR GROUPED BY DIVIDEND YIELD
Group
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Dividend Yield (y) 
y<=2%
2%<y<=4%
4%<y<=6%
y>6%
y<=2%
2%<y<=4%
4%<y<=6%
y>6%
Post–Act
     N
4,094
3,673
1,052
212
4,749
3,839
721
140
Median
0.547***
0.451***
0.751***
0.998
0.712***
0.686***
0.932**
1.157**
 S.D.
8.653a
3.274c
1.826c
1.466
6.144
2.396c
1.196c
1.454
 Mean
0.648***
0.456***
0.731***
0.958
0.719***
0.760***
0.958
1.100**
 SE
0.077b
0.039c
0.044c
0.065
0.049
0.026c
0.031b
0.049
Pre–Act
Notes: 
We separate the sample into groups based on annualized dividend yields. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. 
The mean PDR is adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; 
Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. Statistical signifi cance for testing mean or median 
PDR different from one is indicated in the table. We also test for the difference between the PDR of the dividend 
yield group and the next higher dividend yield group (e.g., group 1 to group 2).
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a, b, and c indicates statistically signifi cant (10%, 5%, and 1% levels) difference from the next dividend yield 
group.
18 Graham et al. (2003) divide observations based on quarterly dividend yields into fi ve groups: less than 0.5 
percent, between 0.5 and one percent, between one and 1.5 percent, between 1.5 and 2.0 percent, and greater 
than 2.0 percent. Because we have a very small number of observations with an annual dividend yield greater 
than eight percent  (2% × 4), we combine these observations into the fourth group.
19 The graph of the median PDR shows a similar pattern.
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low dividend paying stocks, which should 
lead to a low PDR. But in our sample, the 
PDR of the lowest dividend yield group 
(group 1—with an annual dividend yield 
less than or equal to two percent) is signifi -
cantly higher than that of the next higher 
dividend yield group. We are not the fi rst 
to document such a pattern, as similar 
results appear in Elton and Gruber (1970), 
and Michaely (1991) among others. Elton 
and Gruber (1970), however, attribute the 
high PDR for the low dividend yield stocks 
to the bias of the data as small dividends 
drive the PDR misleadingly high or to the 
large standard deviation of their results. 
In our study, we winsorize the data to 
reduce the impact of outliers and correct 
for heteroskedasticity of the dividend 
yield effect by assigning lower weights 
to low dividend yield stocks. Cloyd et al. 
(2006) discuss several factors which may 
distort the positive relation between the 
dividend yield and the ex–dividend day 
PDR (or excess return). In the post–Act 
period, the PDR and the dividend yield 
generally exhibit a positive relation.
We fi nd similar results, as outlined in 
Table 6, when analyzing the ex–dividend 
day excess return behavior across the 
same dividend yield groups. We fi nd that 
ex–dividend day excess returns for all the 
dividend yield groups are signifi cantly 
positive before the 2003 Act. After the 
2003 Act, excess returns decline signifi -
cantly relative to pre–Act returns for each 
dividend yield group, and the two highest 
dividend yield groups have insignifi cant 
excess returns. Figure 3 illustrates the 
arch shape of the excess returns across 
dividend yield groups, which corresponds 
with the U–shape of the PDR depicted 
in Figure 2. Low (high) dividend yield 
stocks exhibit a positive (negative) rela-
tion between the excess return and the 
dividend yield. Our high dividend yield 
result is consistent with the fi ndings of 
Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert 
(2000) who suggest that the clientele for 
high dividend yield stocks are corporate 
investors.
ABNORMAL TRADING VOLUME 
ANALYSIS
As previously hypothesized, we expect 
that the trading volume around the ex–div-
idend day will decrease signifi cantly after 
the 2003 Act (Hypothesis 3) and that the 
Figure 2. PDR by Dividend Yield Group
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trading volume will be positively related 
to dividend yield and negatively related 
to risk and transaction costs (Hypothesis 
4). Thus, to analyze tax–induced trading 
around the ex–dividend day, we estimate 
abnormal trading volume for ten days 
surrounding the ex–dividend day for the 
pre– and post–Act period. We also ana-
lyze abnormal trading volume for high 
dividend yield stocks that we defi ne as 
an annualized dividend yield greater than 
four percent. We use four percent since 
Graham et al. (2003) fi nd that most AV 
activity occurs in stocks with quarterly 
dividend yields above one percent and 
argue that the result is consistent with 
greater dividend capture activity where 
the payoff to such activity is highest. 
Analyzing the full sample results in 
Table 7, Panel A, we fi nd signifi cant posi-
tive AV for most of the 11 days around the 
ex–dividend day and AV is much higher 
Figure 3. Ex–dividend Day Excess Return by Dividend Yield Group
TABLE 6
EXCESS RETURN GROUPED BY DIVIDEND YIELD
Pre–Act Post–Act
Group
1
2
3
4
Dividend Yield (y) 
y<=2%
2%<y<=4%
4%<y<=6%
y>6%
N
4,094
3,673
1,052
    212
ER (%) 
     0.142***
     0.443***
     0.333***
0.130
SE (%)
    0.030c 
    0.029a
0.052
0.122
N
4,749
3,839
    721
    140
ER (%) 
   0.094***
   0.163***
 0.027
–0.137
SE (%)
    0.019b
    0.020c
    0.036b
0.111
Notes: 
We separate the sample into groups based on annualized dividend yields. The mean excess return is adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 
1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. Standard errors for the mean excess return are reported. Statistical signifi cance for 
testing mean excess return different from zero is indicated in the table. We also test for the difference in the excess 
return between the dividend yield group and the next higher dividend yield group (e.g., group 1 to group 2).
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a, b, and c indicates statistically signifi cant (10%, 5%, and 1% levels) difference from the next dividend yield group.
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on the cum–dividend day (day –1) and 
ex–dividend day (day 0) than the other 
days. Panel B of Table 7 shows even higher 
AV for high dividend yield stocks, which 
is consistent with the tax–induced trading 
theory. When the dividend yield is high, 
the tax benefi t of exchanging dividends 
and capital gains is greater, thus provid-
ing greater motivation for investors to 
trade. In the pre–Act period, the high 
dividend yield stocks have an average 
AV of 35.86 percent on the cum–dividend 
day and 28.62 percent on the ex–divi-
dend day. In the post–Act period, the AV 
decreases to only 18.02 percent on the 
cum–dividend day and 19.83 percent on 
the ex–dividend day. Figure 4 depicts the 
CAV from days –5 to +5 for the pre– and 
post–Act period. The CAV for the pre– 
and post–Act period does not exhibit a 
pronounced difference for the full sample 
of dividend paying firms. Figure 5 
depicts the CAV only for the high divi-
dend yield stocks. For the high divi-
dend yield sample, the post–Act period 
CAV is lower than that in the pre–Act 
period particularly after the cum–divi-
dend day. 
We also calculate the CAV as the sum of 
the AV during the 11–day event window 
encompassing the ex–dividend day. We 
further separate the sample into low–, 
medium– and high–yield dividend pay-
ing groups (annual dividend yields less 
than or equal to two percent, two to four 
percent, and greater than four percent, 
respectively). We present the average CAV 
for the 11–day event window in Table 8. 
For the full sample, the CAV is 27.29 per-
cent before the 2003 Act and 31.53 percent 
after the 2003 Act. The difference is not 
signifi cant at conventional levels. How-
ever, when we separate the sample into 
low–, medium– and high–yield groups, 
the strong positive relation between divi-
dend yield and trading volume becomes 
obvious. The magnitude of the CAV for 
the low–yield group (3.22 percent) and 
the medium–yield group (0.49 percent) 
before the 2003 Act is insignifi cant from 
zero and much lower than that of the 
high–yield group (183.14 percent). In the 
post–act period, the CAV of the low– and 
medium–yield groups increases to 16.44 
percent and 34.58 percent, respectively. 
But only the change in the medium–yield 
TABLE 7
THE AV FOR THE TEN DAYS SURROUNDING THE EX–DIVIDEND DAY
Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: High Dividend Yield
Pre–Act Pre–ActPost–Act Post–Act
Day
–5
–4
–3
–2
–1
0
1
2
3
4
5
AV (%)
 2.83***
 4.96***
 2.31
 0.78***
12.48***
18.44***
 6.05***
13.07***
 0.16
–0.42
 0.11
t–stat
 2.42
 3.10
 1.75
 0.56
 6.98
 7.08
 2.53
 2.53
 0.12
–0.20
 0.07
AV (%)
 7.75***
 6.81***
 5.51***
 4.91***
11.90***
 7.72***
 2.60**
 3.40***
 3.08***
 1.30
 2.44***
t–stat
5.55
5.00
3.75
3.43
6.01
7.32
2.07
2.84
2.80
1.18
2.28
AV (%)
 2.10
 3.12
–0.09
 0.60
 35.86***
 28.62***
 3.38
 2.82
–1.95
–4.19
–1.53
t–stat
 0.89
 1.30
–0.04
 0.25
 9.79
 8.43
 1.38
 1.05
–0.84
–1.75
–0.66
AV (%)
 3.44
 0.48
 4.24*
 9.90***
18.02***
19.83***
 0.95
–0.64
 2.72
–0.63
–2.64
t–stat
 1.81
 0.25
 2.10
 4.76
 8.25
 8.36
 0.49
–0.32
 1.38
–0.34
–1.13
Notes: 
AV is defi ned as the difference between a stock’s actual to average turnover, relative to the average turnover. Daily 
turnover is defi ned as the ratio of daily shares traded to shares outstanding. We compute the average turnover 
by using the estimation period [–45, –6] and [6, 45]. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. T–statistics for testing 
whether AV is equal to zero are computed using the cross–sectional estimates of the variance of AV. Pre–Act 
period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 
2005. The high dividend yield sample is those stocks with an annualized dividend yield greater than 4%. The 
CAV in Figures 4 and 5 is the sum of the AV up to and including that day.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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group is statistically signifi cant. Alterna-
tively, the CAV of the high–yield group 
declines significantly after the 2003 
Act to 101.12 percent. These results are 
generally consistent with our fourth 
hypothesis. With the reduction of the tax 
heterogeneity in the market, ex–dividend 
day trading volume decreases for high 
dividend yield stocks as the tax–induced 
motives to trade decrease. However, the 
overall trading volume is not signifi cantly 
different between pre– and post–Act since 
most of our sample is low– and medium–
dividend yield stocks.20 For low– and 
medium–yield dividend paying stocks, 
most trading may be for non–tax reasons 
since a small dividend is not attractive 
in terms of tax considerations, however, 
investors may time their trading around 
the ex–dividend day to capture abnormal 
returns. Thus, the effect of the reduction in 
tax heterogeneity on tax–motivated trad-
ing does not show up in the full sample 
results.
We also analyze the effect of risk and 
transaction costs on the ex–dividend day 
Figure 4. Cumulative Abnormal Volume
Figure 5. CAV of High Dividend Yield Group
20 If we estimate the full sample without winsorizing the data, we fi nd that the overall CAV signifi cantly decreases 
in the post–Act period. We also estimate AV utilizing the log of turnover as described by Chae (2005), but fi nd 
that our results are highly sensitive to this adjustment. We note that much of the abnormal trading volume 
activity occurs for high dividend yield stocks. Thus, mitigating the effect of the high dividend yield stocks on 
abnormal trading volume makes it diffi cult to draw inferences regarding dividend clienteles. Therefore, we 
caution the reader that our results are sensitive to the choice of proxy for abnormal trading volume and the 
trimming of volume data.
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trading volume. Following Michaely 
and Vila (1996), we regress CAV on 
dividend yield, idiosyncratic risk, beta, 
market capitalization, and a post–Act 
dummy variable for the full sample and 
each of the three dividend yield groups. 
Results are shown in Table 9. We fi nd 
a signifi cant negative relation between 
idiosyncratic risk and trading volume for 
high– and low–yield stocks, but an insig-
nifi cant relation between idiosyncratic 
risk and trading volume for medium–
TABLE 8
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL VOLUME
Pre–Act Post–Act Post–Pre
Full sample
Low–yield group
Medium–yield group
High–yield group
N
9,031
4,094
3,673
1,264
CAV (%)
27.29***
(4.99)
3.22
(0.44)
0.49
(0.06)
183.14***
(10.48)
N
9,449
4,749
3,839
     861
CAV (%)
31.53***
(7.28)
16.44***
(2. 78)
34.58***
(4.90)
101.12***
(7.22)
CAV (%)
4.24
(0.61)
13.22
(1.41)
34.09***
(3.03)
–82.03***
(–3.66)
Notes: 
The CAV is the sum of the AV during the 11–day event window encompassing the ex–dividend day. Data are 
winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. Low dividend yield group has an annualized dividend yield less than or equal 
to 2%. High dividend yield group has an annualized dividend yield greater than 4%. The remainder of the 
sample is the medium–yield group. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act 
period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 9
TESTS OF THE CHANGE IN THE CAV
Intercept
PostDum
Yield
Risk
Beta
Market cap
Sample size
R2
Full Sample
–3.165*** 
(–15.14)
0.176**
(2.34)
28.419*** 
(13.18)
–0.018** 
(–2.49)
–0.421*** 
(–6.03)
0.213*** 
(15.69)
18,480
0.0226
High–Yield Group
–3.652***
(–5.73)
–0.820***
(–3.21)
28.021***
(5.41)
–0.091**
(–3.15)
–0.890*** 
(–3.37)
0.338***
(7.54)
2,125
0.0610
Medium–Yield Group
–2.848***
(–6.69)
0.334***
(2.74)
–1.609
(–0.16)
0.011
(0.91)
–0.417***
(–3.77)
0.228***
(10.58)
7,512
0.0165
Low–Yield Group
–1.758***
(–5.15)
0.295***
(2.92)
0.092
(0.01)
–0.032***
(–3.44)
–0.316***
(–3.38)
0.139***
(6.95)
8,843
0.0092
Notes: 
We test the structural changes in CAV ten days surrounding the ex–dividend day. The dependent variable of the 
Ordinary Least Squares model is the CAV. Data are winsorized at [2.5%, 97.5%]. Pre–Act period is from February 1, 
2001 to December 31, 2002; Post–Act period is from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2005. PostDum = 0 for Pre–Act 
period and 1 otherwise. Low–yield group has an annualized dividend yield less than or equal to 2%. High–yield 
group has an annualized dividend yield greater than 4%. The remainder of the sample is the medium–yield group. 
Dividend yield is calculated by dividing the dividend amount by the cum–dividend day closing price. Risk is mea-
sured by the variance of a security’s return scaled by the variance of the market return during the estimation period 
[–25, –6] and [6, 25]. Beta is obtained from the OLS market model. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization on the cum–dividend day (i.e., cum–dividend day price multiplied by the outstanding 
shares). T–statistics for testing the difference from zero are in parentheses.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical signifi cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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yield stocks.21 The coeffi cients of beta are 
signifi cantly negative for all groups, con-
sistent with the fi nding of Michaely and 
Vila (1996). Also the coeffi cient on market 
capitalization is positive and signifi cant 
in all specifications that is consistent 
with the prediction that transaction costs 
decrease trading volume. In addition, 
we fi nd the dividend yield effect is only 
signifi cant for the high–yield sample and 
the full sample. The cumulative trading 
volume for high dividend yield stocks sig-
nifi cantly declines after the 2003 Act even 
after controlling for risk, transaction costs, 
and market risk, indicated by the signifi -
cant negative coeffi cient on the post–Act 
dummy variable: –0.820. In general, our 
results support a positive relation between 
trading volume and dividend yield, a 
negative relation between trading volume 
and risk, and a negative relation between 
trading volume and transaction costs as 
predicted by the fourth hypothesis, but 
our results appear to be driven by high 
dividend paying stocks. 
CONCLUSION
The paper examines the effect of the 
2003 Act on investor behavior. The net 
effect of the 2003 Act was to align the tax 
rates on capital gains and dividends for 
individual investors, whereas previously 
individual investors paid a higher rate on 
dividend income relative to capital gains. 
We fi nd that more corporations tend to 
pay dividends in the post–Act period. 
We also fi nd that dividend paying fi rms 
increased the amount of dividends per 
share, but the dividend yield tends to 
decrease in the post–Act period. Analyz-
ing tax relevance versus tax irrelevance 
on ex–dividend day market behavior, our 
fi ndings support the tax–based view that 
the relative taxation of dividends versus 
capital gains does affect ex–dividend day 
price and trading behavior. We fi nd that 
the ex–dividend day PDR increases and 
the excess return decreases in the post–Act 
period. 
We also find evidence that overall 
dividend clienteles weaken after the 
2003 Act as evidenced by a decrease in 
the relation between the dividend yield 
and the ex–dividend day PDR (or excess 
return). Consistent with the trading clien-
tele theory, we fi nd a signifi cant effect of 
transaction costs on the ex–dividend day 
PDR and excess returns, and a signifi cant 
effect of risk on the PDR. As the tax hetero-
geneity among investors is reduced after 
the Act, tax–motivated trading around the 
ex–dividend day declines signifi cantly for 
high dividend yield stocks. We also fi nd 
that trading volume is negatively related 
to risk and transaction costs and posi-
tively related to dividend yield although 
the result appears to be driven by high 
dividend yield stocks. We interpret our 
results to be generally consistent with 
the dynamic trading clientele model of 
Michaely and Vila (1995). The ex–divi-
dend day stock price and trading behavior 
is jointly affected by relative taxation of 
dividend versus capital gains, risk, and 
transaction costs. Given that the 2003 Act 
only affects the relative tax rates for indi-
vidual investors, our results suggest that 
individual investors play an important 
role in ex–dividend day price formation 
and trading activities.
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